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I. INTRODUCTION
THE MONTREAL CONVENTION is a comprehensive inter-national treaty that addresses private international air law.'
"In 1999, the International Civil Aviation Organization con-
vened an international conference in Montreal to negotiate and
adopt [the Montreal Convention] to replace the Warsaw Con-
vention,"2 a treaty drafted in 1929 when "the airline industry was
[still] in its infancy."' The Montreal Convention entered into
force in the United States on November 4, 2003.*
Since that time, U.S. courts have issued numerous opinions
analyzing and applying various portions of the Montreal Con-
' Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
2 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 501 F. Supp. 2d 902, 907
(E.D. Ky. 2007).
3 Id. at 906 (quoting Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 370 (2d Cir.
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Id. at 905 n.2.
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vention. This article examines the key opinions from this past
year, organized by topic.5 As in years past, whether a particular
incident constitutes an "accident" for purposes of Article 17 of
the Montreal Convention continues to be a frequent focus of
litigation.' Preemption issues also continue to be an area of fo-
cus. Opinions discussing the Montreal Convention can some-
times have colorful facts, and this year's opinions were certainly
no exception.
II. "ACCIDENT" UNDER ARTICLE 17
A. CAN A HEART ATTACK CONSTITUTE AN "ACCIDENT" UNDER
ARTICLE 17?
In Siddiq v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., a passenger suffered
cardiac arrest while on a flight between Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
and Dulles International Airport in Virginia.' "Although [he]
survived the heart attack, he allegedly suffered 'serious irreversi-
ble' bodily injuries and other damages due to unnecessary and
unexpected delay in obtaining necessary medical treatment."8
The passenger asserted a claim against the airline under Article
17 of the Montreal Convention.' The plaintiff argued that the
"'accident' was '[the d] efendant's failure to land to get Mr. Sid-
diq help' since such failure 'represents [the defendant's] unex-
pected and unusual break from its own policies, . . . passenger
safety considerations[,] and airline industry standards." 0
The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
incident was clearly an "accident" under the Montreal Conven-
tion.'1 The court denied the motion, concluding that there were
genuine issues of material fact on the issue. 12 The court ac-
knowledged that "[w]hile a passenger's heart attack is not an
'accident' because it is not 'external' to the passenger, a defen-
dant air carrier's response to a passenger's heart attack may con-
5 This article examines opinions from January 2013 through February 2014.
6 Paragraph 1 of Article 17 "provides for carrier liability for death or bodily
injury of a passenger caused by an accident on board the aircraft or in the course
of embarking or disembarking." Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. 17(1).
7 Siddiq v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., No. 6:11-cv-69-Orl-19GJK, 2013 WL
2152566, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2013).
8 Id. (citation omitted).
9 Id. at *2.
10 Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
1 Id.
12 Id. at *-7.
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stitute an 'accident' if it is sufficiently unexpected or unusual."1 3
It also acknowledged that "[o]nce all available evidence is
presented at trial, it may very well be apparent that Pilot Zarie's
failure to divert was both unexpected and unusual, but no such
determination can be made at this time on the record presented
as a matter of law."14
B. CAN A DISAGREEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT ALTERCATION
BETWEEN A PASSENGER AND A FLIGHT ATTENDANT
CONSTITUTE AN "ACCIDENT" UNDER
ARTICLE 17?
In Dogbe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the seventy-one-year-old plain-
tiff was scheduled to travel from Norfolk, Virginia, to Accra,
Ghana, via a connecting flight atJohn F. Kennedy Airport (JFK)
in New York City." The flight from Norfolk to JFK was delayed,
which caused the plaintiff to miss his connecting flight fromJFK
to Accra.1 6 While Delta attempted to reassign him to a new flight
to Accra, the plaintiff stood in line for approximately three
hours at JFK 7 During this waiting time, he "experienced pain
and discomfort in his legs that was exacerbated by Delta's failure
to offer [him] a place to sit and the day's cold weather."" Delta
eventually sent the plaintiff back to Norfolk and scheduled him
on a new flight from Norfolk to Accra via JFK three days later:
Flight 166 on January 2, 2011.19
"Due to lingering pain in his legs as the result of his three-
hour wait in line on December 29th, on January 2nd [the] plain-
tiff requested and received wheelchair assistance from Delta at
Norfolk and JFK."2 0 Seated aboard the 4:15 p.m. Delta flight to
Accra, he "continued to experience discomfort in his legs due to
the December 29th wait and the extended period during which
[the] plaintiff sat in a wheelchair prior to boarding the flight to
Accra."2 1 He asked a crewmember if he could have a seat with
more leg room in order to "stretch his legs so that his 'blood
1 Id. at *5 (citations omitted).
14 Id. at *6.









could flow properly.' However, the male crewmember advised
[the] plaintiff that no such seating was available."2 2
After another passenger pointed out certain empty seats with
more legroom, the plaintiff asked the crewmember whether he
could use one of those seats. The crewmember did not respond
and turned and walked away.23 "Shortly thereafter, an unidenti-
fied female Delta crewmember approached [the] plaintiff and
stated, 'If you can't sit in your assigned seat, you may have to get
off the plane,' before walking away without further explanation.
[The p]laintiff was confused by the female crewmember's
warning. "24
Then a third Delta employee approached the plaintiff.25 He
"demanded that [the] plaintiff follow him on foot to the front of
the plane, despite . . . having been aware that [the] plaintiff
boarded the plane by wheelchair. Despite his discomfort, [the]
plaintiff complied with [this] demand and walked to the front of
the plane."26 There, the Delta employee said, "'I agree [100%]
with the female crewmember.' "27 When the plaintiff attempted
to clarify what he did wrong, the Delta employee told him to
"get off the plane."2 The plaintiff was confused and explained
"that he did not understand why he was being asked to deplane,
to which [the Delta employee] stated that it was because of
[the] plaintiffs 'attitude."' 2 9 The Delta employee summoned
the Port Authority Police and several ground crew employees,
who "began to gather into a mob and proceeded to rankle and
yell at [the] plaintiff, trying to chide him into leaving the plane
without explanation or cause."o In fact, a ground crew em-
ployee "boarded the plane, grabbed [the] plaintiffs arm, and
began physically assaulting him.""
The situation continued to escalate.
Soon thereafter, two female Port Authority Police Officers, iden-
tified in the Amended Complaint as "Jane Doe 1" and 'Jane Doe
2," approached [the] plaintiff in an "unreasonably frightening,
hostile[,] and aggressive manner" that made [the] plaintiff be-
22 Id. (citations omitted).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 264-65 (citations omitted).
25 Id. at 265.




30 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
31 Id. (citations omitted).
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lieve that he was not free to leave the area. As the officers ap-
proached, [the] plaintiff attempted to calm the Delta employees
by advising them that he merely wanted a seating accommoda-
tion for his disability.
[The p]laintiff then stated that he was a loyal Delta customer and
member of Delta's "Sky Miles Club." [The p]laintiff next at-
tempted to display his Sky Miles Club membership card, at which
point either Jane Doe 1 or Jane Doe 2 forcefully struck [the]
plaintiffs hand in an apparent attempt to knock the member-
ship card out of his hand. While remaining calm, [the] plaintiff
asked the police officers why his hand had been struck. One or
both of the police officers then forcefully tackled [the] plaintiff
to the ground. While [the] plaintiff was lying face-down on the
ground, one or both of the police officers sat on [the] plaintiff,
which caused his rib to fracture, and a neck injury."
The police officers handcuffed the plaintiff and ignored the
plaintiffs pleas that they loosen his handcuffs, which had be-
come tight and were causing "pain and suffering."3 3 While still
handcuffed, the plaintiff was dragged out of the plane, interro-
gated, "repeatedly asked if he had been drinking or using
drugs," and told "that he was 'banned' from flying on Delta for
one year."34
Eventually, the Port Authority Police released the plaintiff so
that an ambulance could take him to the emergency room of
Jamaica Hospital in Queens, where the plaintiff "was examined,
treated, and released that same day."3 "[The p]laintiff contin-
ued to suffer great pain from his injuries after being released
from the hospital."3 ' The plaintiffs family physician examined
the plaintiff on a later day and diagnosed the plaintiff "with a
fractured rib and a 'serious' neck injury."" In addition to these
physical injuries, the plaintiffs "clothing and personal items
were soiled, torn, or otherwise damaged, and he suffered embar-
rassment, humiliation, anxiety, stress, and emotional distress.""
During the pendency of the lawsuit, the plaintiff continued to
receive medical treatment and therapy for his injuries.
32 Id. (citations omitted).
3 Id. at 265 (citations omitted).




38 Id. (citations omitted).
3 Id.
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After the lawsuit was filed, Delta filed a motion to dismiss the
claims, "argu[ing] that [the] plaintiff [could not] state viable
injury claims against Delta under [the Montreal Convention]
because [the] plaintiffs injuries were not caused by an 'acci-
dent,' as that term is understood in the context of Article 17 of
[the C]onvention."4 0 The court agreed and granted the mo-
tion.4 1 The court employed the common definition of "acci-
dent": "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger"-which is to be applied "flexibly[-]
... after assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a pas-
senger's injuries."4 2 "The [Supreme] Court further explained
that 'any injury is the product of a chain of causes, and we re-
quire only that the passenger be able to prove that some link in
the chain was an unusual or unexpected event external to the
passenger.'"4 "Thus, 'courts apply proximate cause analysis in
determining whether an unusual event is a link in the chain that
led to an accident . . . .'"4
The plaintiff contended that "(1) Delta's failure to accommo-
date [his] medical condition and disability, (2) Delta's giving
false information to the Port Authority Police, and (3) the Port
Authority Police's use of excessive force" combined together to
cause his injuries." However, the court concluded that none of
these alleged events satisfy the Article 17 definition of an
accident: 6
First, [the] plaintiff does not allege that he has any disability for
which accommodation was necessary. Rather, the Amended
Complaint contains only a single passing reference to [the]
plaintiffs "leg pain disability," which [the] plaintiff himself at-
tributes to having stood and sat for a long period of time on De-
cember 29, 2010, and January 2, 2011. . . . Second, an airline
employee's giving of false information about a passenger to the
police might, in certain circumstances, give rise to liability by the
airline for passenger injuries caused by the police. Here, how-
ever, the Amended Complaint fails to allege any false statement
to the Port Authority Police by .. . any . .. Delta employee ....
Third, the court makes no determination at this time as to the
40 Id. at 271, 274 (citations omitted).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 271-72 (quoting Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985)).
43 Id. at 272 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 406).
Id. (quoting Cush v. BWIA Int'l Airways, Ltd., 175 F. Supp. 2d 483, 487
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reasonableness of the force used against [the] plaintiff by Jane
Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 on behalf of the Port Authority. It is clear,
however, that [the] plaintiff has failed to allege plausible facts
that John Doe or any other Delta employee exercised control
over Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and the Port Authority, each of
whom are separately named defendants in this case."
Summarizing, the court explained that "[f] or purposes of the
instant motions to dismiss, only [the] plaintiffs refusal to disem-
bark from the plane can be said to have proximately caused his
alleged injuries."4 8 "Because [the] plaintiff chose to so refuse,
his subsequent injuries were not caused by an 'accident' for
which Delta is liable under Article 17 of the Conventions. "49 The
"[p]laintiffs Article 17 claim against Delta [was] therefore
dismissed."5 0
C. CAN A PUSH FROM ANOTHER PASSENGER WHILE DEPLANING
CONSTITUTE AN "ACCIDENT" UNDER ARTICLE 17?
The Buckwalters flew from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to St.
Maarten on U.S. Airways Flight 1209.51 "Upon arrival in St.
Maarten, [the p]laintiffs disembarked using air stairs. When
Mrs. Buckwalter stepped onto the landing at the top of the air
stairs, she was carrying only her purse, and she held onto the
railing. [She] did not request assistance from the crew during
the deplaning process. "52
There was an incident on the air stairs.
Another passenger on the flight, M. Hallsted Christ, departed
the plane after Mrs. Buckwalter but before Mr. Buckwalter ....
As Mr. Christ was descending the air stairs behind Mrs.
Buckwalter, he fell into her and knocked her onto the tarmac.
Mr. Christ does not know what caused him to fall, but testified
that "I believe that if anything it was that I was just overloaded
with my luggage." Mrs. Buckwalter has no memory of her fall,
nor did Mr. Buckwalter observe her fall. The air stairs were ob-
served to be in "working condition," with no defects or abnormal-
ities. Mr. Buckwalter did not observe anything unusual about the
stairs as he descended them behind his wife and Mr. Christ."
4 Id. at 272-73 (citations omitted).
48 Id. at 274.
4 Id.
50 Id.
51 Buckwalter v. U.S. Airways, Inc., No. 12-2586, 2014 WL 116264, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 13, 2014) (citations omitted).
52 Id. (citations omitted).
53 Id. (citations omitted).
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Defendant U.S. Airways moved for summary judgment, argu-
ing that "the incident at issue . .. was not caused by an 'accident'
under the Montreal Convention, which presents the sole cause
of action available to [the p]laintiffs."5 4 U.S. Airways "argue [d]
that, in addition to the requirement that the accident be an un-
expected or unusual event external to the plaintiff, the Supreme
Court's definition of 'accident' also includes a requirement that
the event result from some malfunction or abnormality in the
aircraft's operation."5 5 The plaintiff pointed out the split in au-
thority on whether there is a second aircraft operation prong to
the definition of "accident," and argued there was no such sec-
ond requirement.56
The court decided the debate was irrelevant, as there were
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mrs. Buckwalter's
fall was "related in any way to the operation of the aircraft or any
act of the crew."5 Specifically, the court concluded that "Mr.
Christ's fall into Mrs. Buckwalter could very well relate to 'an act
of the crew,' thereby satisfying the 'aircraft operation prong.' "58
The court first reasoned that there was a factual dispute regard-
ing whether the deplaning process was disorderly:
Mr. Christ testified that "there were a lot of people all pushing to
try to get off the plane. And it was sort of disorderly frankly. . ."
Mr. Christ also testified that as he was lining up and exiting the
plane, he felt as if he were being 'hurried.' Similarly, Mrs.
Buckwalter testified that there was crowding as she was exiting
the plane ... .5
Mr. Buckwalter described the people as "kind of inching to-
ward the door[,] and [that] there was what [he would] probably
call a polite pushing."6 0 "Mr. Buckwalter stated that he felt 'un-
comfortable' because 'there was not kind of an orderly single-
file type of deplaning.' However, Flight Attendant Lela Sours
testified that it was a 'very routine deplaning process.'"' In light
of this testimony, the court explained that "[i]f it is true that
there was a disorderly deplaning process that involved pushing
by the passengers, and the flight crew took no action to ensure
54 Id. at *2.
5 Id.
56 Id.




61 Id. (citations omitted).
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an organized deplaning process, then an omission of the flight
crew may have occurred.""2 The court further explained its
reasoning:
[T] here is a dispute as to whether or not, just prior to deplaning,
the flight crew read the warnings required by Defendant's poli-
cies and procedures that inform passengers that air stairs are go-
ing to be used in the disembarking process. Mrs. Buckwalter, Mr.
Buckwalter, and Mr. Christ all testified that no warnings were
given prior to deplaning. However, Flight Attendant Jackie Stall-
man testified that she "read the standard announcement on
[the] flight" which included text regarding the air stairs. Flight
Attendant Sours also testified that Stallman had made "the arri-
val announcement that [they] would be deplaning by air stairs,
please be careful, please hold the handrail." Whether the an-
nouncement regarding the use of air stairs was made or not is a
fact for the jury to determine. If it is true that the flight crew was
required by Defendant's policies to make an announcement
warning the passengers that they were going to deplane via air
stairs and failed to make that announcement, an omission of the
flight crew occurred and Mrs. Buckwalter's fall may be related to
the operation of the aircraft.
As such, the court denied U.S. Airways' Motion for Summary
Judgment.6 4
D. CAN AN ALTERCATION WITH A FLIGHT ATTENDANT
CONSTITUTE AN "ACCIDENT" UNDER ARTICLE 17?
In Kruger v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., the "[p]laintiffs
bought four non-refundable round-trip tickets for a family vaca-
tion" to India.6" When the family arrived in Delhi where they
would catch a connecting flight, Mrs. Kruger asked a flight at-
tendant if she could disembark before first class passengers so
that she would not miss her connecting flight, but the flight at-
tendant said no. 6 6 "Finally, the [first] class passengers had all
departed, and [the flight attendant] stood aside to let the econ-
omy and premium economy passengers through."" As she ex-
ited the airplane, Mrs. Kruger's shoulder made contact with the
flight attendant's chest." The flight attendant "claims to have
62 Id.
63 Id. (citations omitted).
64 Id. at *4.






been in pain and that she sat down while the rest of the passen-
gers left the plane."69 The flight attendant requested that the
captain of the aircraft call the police and accused Mrs. Kruger of
"intentionally 'barg [ing]' into [her] and calling her a 'bitch.' "70
However, "Mrs. Kruger maintains that she tripped, and she be-
lieves that she may have been intentionally tripped by [the flight
attendant].... After the incident, Mrs. Krugerjoined her family
heading towards Gate 22 for their connecting flight.""
The court explained that the plaintiffs were embarking when
the incident occurred.
Plaintiffs made their way directly to Gate 22. To reach Gate 22,
they went to the end of a dead-end corridor. There, they got in
line to enter a special glass-enclosed area at the entrance to the
Gate. Mrs. Kruger was waiting to board when she was arrested.
There were severe restrictions on her movement, both because
airline personnel had possession of her passport and boarding
pass for part of the time and because she was trying to catch a
flight that was about to leave. And she was arrested at the check
in desk to the area around the Gate.72
The plaintiffs filed suit against the airline asserting claims for
"breach of contract, negligence, loss of consortium, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, and false imprison-
ment."7 3 The airline filed a motion for summary judgment,
which was granted in a Report and Recommendations of the
Magistrate Judge.7 ' The district court upheld the Report and
Recommendations.
The first issue was whether the incident with the flight attend-
ant was an "accident" under the Montreal Convention.76 The
court noted that "[tihe Supreme Court has defined 'acci-
dent'under the Convention as 'an unexpected or unusual event
or happening that is external to the passenger. The definition
'should be flexibly applied after assessment of all the circum-
stances surrounding a passenger's injuries.'" 7 7 The court con-
cluded that "Mrs. Kruger's arrest as she was about to board her
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 294-95 (citations omitted).
72 Id. at 303.
73 Id. at 296.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 300-01.
77 Id. at 301.
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next flight was certainly an 'unexpected and unusual event' and
something courts have fairly characterized as an accident."7
However, "[t]he other component of personal liability under
the Montreal Convention is the location of the accident ....
[The plaintiff argued that] Mrs. Kruger was not in the process of
embarking the aircraft within the meaning of the Montreal Con-
vention."7 The court applied the Second Circuit's "four-prong
test to determine whether a passenger was embarking on the
aircraft within the meaning of the Montreal Convention: (1) the
activity of the passengers, (2) restrictions on the passengers'
movement, (3) imminence of actual boarding, (4) proximity of
passengers to the gate."so The court analyzed each of these fac-
tors and concluded that the Krugers were in the process of em-
barking.8 ' The court contrasted the facts of its case to other
situations in which boarding is not imminent, where passengers
have relatively unrestricted movement at a terminal, and where
the connecting flight is with another airline.8 2 Because the alter-
cation was an "accident" under Article 17 that occurred while
embarking, the Montreal Convention applied to the plaintiffs
injury.83 As such, the Montreal Convention preempted the
plaintiffs' state law claims.8 4
III. PREEMPTION
A. ARE STATE LAW CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF BAGGAGE CLAIM
SHENANIGANS PREEMPTED BY THE
MONTREAL CONVENTION?
In Bridgeman v. United Continental Holdings, Inc., the plaintiffs
were returning to Norfolk, Virginia from Costa Rica." As the
plaintiffs' bags came around the carousel in the baggage-claim
area of the Norfolk airport, "they discovered, to their surprise
and horror, that a sex toy had been removed from one of their
bags, covered in a greasy foul-smelling substance, and taped
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. (citing Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.
1990)).
81 Id. at 302-03.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 303.
84 Id.
85 Bridgeman v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc., 552 F. App'x 294, 295 (5th Cir.
2013).
MONTREAL CONVENTION LITIGATION. 0
atop the bag." 6 The plaintiffs were so "extremely embarrassed
by the surprised and laughing faces of onlookers," that they
called two friends to assist them home.
The plaintiffs filed claims of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, invasion of privacy, and negligence in Texas state
court.
They asserted that the bag at all times . . . was in the custody of
United and that, during this time, one or more of United's em-
ployees had searched their bag, removed the toy, defiled it, and
then taped it to the top of the bag. [The pilaintiffs alleged that
these acts were directed towards them because they are homosex-
uals and male. Finally, [the p]laintiffs alleged that, as a result of
these actions, they suffered severe emotional distress and mental
anguish requiring the help of mental health care professionals.
[The p]laintiffs did not allege that they suffered any physical in-
juries. Nor did [the p]laintiffs seek to recover for damage to their
bags."
United removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas and then filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing "that (1) [the p]laintiffs' claims are preempted by Arti-
cle 17 of the Montreal Convention[,] . . . and that (2) because
the Montreal Convention does not provide a remedy for claims
alleging only emotional damages, [the p]laintiffs have no basis
for relief."9
United argued that one or both of two provisions of the Mon-
treal Convention preempted the plaintiffs' claims: Article 17(1),
which "imposes liability on carriers for injuries to passengers"
when the alleged misconduct takes place "on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or dis-
embarking;" and Article 17(2), which imposes liability "for dam-
age to baggage."O The court rejected both bases for
preemption."
As for Article 17(1), the court explained that "any connection
between the alleged misconduct-the display of [the p]1laintiffs'
bag in the baggage-claim area-and the 'operations of embark-
ing or disembarking' is tenuous at best."9 2 The court relied on a
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 295-96.
89 Id. at 296.
9o Id. at 297.
91 Id. at 298.
92 Id. at 297.
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decision from the First Circuit, which explained that "the phrase
'in the course of any of the operations of embarking' 'strongly
suggests that there must be a tight tie between an accident and
the physical act of entering an aircraft.' "3 The court found "no
such tight tie here: the events occurred in the baggage-claim
area and were wholly unconnected to [the p]laintiffs' physical
act of exiting the aircraft."9 4
As for Article 17(2), "[the p]laintiffs' state-law claims rel[ied]
on the fact that their bag was 'in the charge of the carrier,' and
it [was] clear that their bag was not destroyed or lost."- The
court explained that the claim was not preempted by Article
17(2), reasoning as follows:
The alleged misconduct in this case simply does not relate to any
damage to [the p]laintiffs' duffel bag, which they admit is "just
fine" and undamaged; rather, [the p]laintiffs seek a remedy for
the way in which their bag was utilized to inflict personal injury.
Accordingly, we decline to shoehorn [the p]laintiffs' claims into
the substantive scope of Article 17(2) merely because a bag is
central to their factual basis. Instead, we reach our conclusion
based on a natural reading of Article 17(2)'s text."
As a result, the plaintiffs' state law claims were not preempted by
the Montreal Convention.
B. ARE CLAIMS FOR ASSAULT, BATTERY, NEGLIGENT HIRING AND
SUPERVISION, AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS THAT ARISE OUT OF AN INCIDENT THAT OCCURS ON
AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT PREEMPTED BY THE
MONTREAL CONVENTION?
In Fadhliah v. Socidtj Air France, the plaintiffs, a family that in-
cluded minor children, purchased "tickets provid[ing] for trans-
portation originating and terminating in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
with agreed stops in Paris, France, and Los Angeles, Califor-
nia. "" When the Fadhliah family boarded the Air France flight
in Los Angeles, the mother, Sarah, believed that another passen-
93 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313,
317 (1st Cir. 1995)).




98 Fadhliah v. Soci&6 Air Fr., No. 2:13-CV-06142-ODW, 2013 WL 6571601, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2013).
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ger was occupying the seat assigned to her son and attempted to
resolve the issue, but she was unsuccessful.
[Sarah] asked a flight attendant to assist [her]. Chief Steward Ru-
dolph van der Schraaf then approached [Sarah] and allegedly
demanded that [Sarah]'s family move to accommodate a French
family that wanted to sit together. When [Sarah] asked van der
Schraaf whether the seats assigned to her family on their board-
ing passes were correct, van der Schraaf allegedly grabbed [Sa-
rah] by the arm to physically move her. Van der Schraaf also
allegedly demanded that Sarah move [her] two-year-old [son]
Abdullah to another seat. When no one moved Abdullah, van
der Schraaf allegedly unbuckled the boy and attempted to pick
him up. During the affray, the aircraft's captain . . . allegedly
shouted at several of the family members to "shut up and sit
down." [One of Sarah's daughters] then got up from her seat,
and the captain shouted, "You, go back to your seat." Van der
Schraaf then allegedly pulled [the girl] by the arm back to her
seat. Security personnel allegedly boarded the plane and forced
the family to disembark. The captain allegedly followed the fam-
ily through the jetway into the terminal, clapping at them to
hurry along."9
The plaintiffs filed suit in Los Angeles County Superior Court,
"alleging state common-law claims for assault, battery, negligent
hiring and supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress" against Air France and van der Schraaf. 0o Air France
removed the case to federal court, arguing that the Montreal
Convention completely preempts all state-law claims in the con-
text of international carriage as applied to this case.'o
The court found that the complete-preemption doctrine ap-
plied in this case, explaining that "[s]everal considerations com-
pel [the c]ourt to conclude that the preemptive force of the
Montreal Convention is so strong that it transmutes [the
p]1laintiffs' facially state-law claims into federal ones under the
complete-preemption doctrine." 02 First, the court relied on
"the preemptive effect of the Warsaw Convention's exclusivity
provision, albeit not in the context of the jurisdictional doctrine
of complete preemption," discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court
in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng' Second, the
99 Id. at *1-2 (citations omitted).
100 Id. at *2.
10 Id.
102 Id. at *3.
103 Id. (citing 525 U.S. 155 (1999)).
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court acknowledged the "striking divide among federal courts
over the Montreal Convention's preemptive effect" and attrib-
uted it to "Article 29's abstruseness."1 0 4
As such, the court resorted to the treaty's drafting history, in
particular the following statement from the Montreal Confer-
ence's Chairman:
The. purpose behind Article 2 [9] was to ensure that, in circum-
stances in which the Convention applied, it was not possible to
circumvent its provisions by bringing an action for damages in
the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo in contract or in
tort or otherwise. Once the Convention applied, its conditions
and limits of liability were applicable.10
The court found that "[t]his statement elucidates that the addi-
tional 'in contract or in tort or otherwise' language simply bol-
sters-not dilutes-the Convention's preemptive effect once
one establishes that an agreement relates to 'international car-
riage' under Article 1."'1
The plaintiffs "argue [d] that there are certain actions to
which the Montreal Convention does not apply and therefore
the Convention cannot completely preempt state common-law
claims." 0 ' The court responded to that argument by explaining
that "the fact that some causes of action might fall outside the
Convention's scope does not prove that the Convention is not
supreme within the context of 'international carriage.' Of
course every treaty is going to have its limits, so some actions
necessarily will not come within the treaty's grasp."1 0 8 For in-
stance, when "[i]nterpreting the term 'air carrier,' . . . the
[Ninth Circuit] concluded that the Convention only began to
apply when a passenger presented herself to the airline for
travel. But the court did not find that there was an exception to
the Convention itself."10 As a result, the court found "that the
Montreal Convention does provide the exclusive cause of action
against Air France and that the [c] ourt thus has federal-question
jurisdiction under the complete-preemption doctrine."11o





I0 Id. (citations omitted).
110 Id. at *6.
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C. Do ALL JUDGES IN THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
AGREE WITH THE FADHLIAH HOLDING?
Oganesyan v. American Airlines Cargo involved removal of a
small claims complaint to federal court."' The plaintiff filed suit
against the defendant in the Small Claims Division of the Los
Angeles County Superior Court "to recover damages for cargo
allegedly damaged during international shipment. [The
d]efendant transported 44 cartons of brandy from Armenia to
Los Angeles in December 2012. . . . On January 11, 2013, [the]
plaintiff faxed a claim form to [the] defendant asserting that
seventeen bottles were broken during shipment and requesting
$4,730.80 in compensation."1 12 The defendant removed the ac-
tion on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under the Mon-
treal Convention."1 "[The diefendant subsequently moved for
summary judgment on the ground that [the] plaintiffs claim
form was untimely under Article 31 of the Convention, and al-
ternatively that [the] defendant's liability is limited by Article
22(3) to . . . $381.52."114
"[The p]laintiff, who [wa]s proceeding pro se, did not move
to remand and did not file an opposition to the motion for sum-
mary judgment."'15 Nevertheless, the court remanded the case
back to the Small Claims Division of the Los Angeles County
Superior Court."' Relying on other district court opinions on
the preemptive effect of the Montreal Convention, the court
held that "the exclusivity provisions of the Montreal Convention
operate as an affirmative defense but do not completely pre-
empt state law causes of action.""' The court further explained:
The Montreal Convention places conditions on determinations
of liability "under local law," but it does not follow that the Treaty
completely supplants all causes of action founded on local law.
The fact that individual claims may be preempted does not mean
the entire field is preempted, and the defense of claim preemp-
I Oganesyan v. Am. Airlines Cargo, No. CV 13-6190 SVW, 2013 WL 6229173,






117 Id. at *3 (quoting Jensen v. Virgin Atl., No. 12-CV-6227 YGR, 2013 WL
1207962, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2013)).
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tion does not convert a complaint brought under state law into
one "arising under" federal law."18
D. WHAT ABOUT THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK?
According to the complaint and amended complaint in Cer-
tain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Art Crating, Inc., the plaintiff,
David Smith, was a "renowned American sculptor, painter,
draftsman and photographer."' 9 His estate allowed Horizontal
9/4/52 (the Sculpture) "to be exhibited by the Institut Valencia
d'Art Modern in Valencia, Spain." 2 0 One defendant, Art Crat-
ing, was hired to crate and to transport the Sculpture from New
York City to Valencia.121 Another defendant, Masterpiece Inter-
national, Ltd., (Masterpiece) was hired "to provide professional
consulting services related to transporting the Sculpture."122 A
third defendant, Delta Airlines, provided the air travel portion
of the shipment.'12 "At some point between November 2010 and
January 2011, the Sculpture was damaged in transport, while in
its crate.... [The plaintiff alleged] the Sculpture 'wasn't packed
properly' by Art Crating, that the packing was not properly over-
seen by Masterpiece, and that 'all that happened in New
York."1 24 The court noted that "prior to being damaged, the
Sculpture was valued at $3.5 million. The Sculpture's value de-
creased by 75% after the damage."125
The complaint, which was filed in the Supreme Court of New
York, Kings County, asserted exclusively state law claims.126 The
defendants removed the case to the Eastern District of New York
on the basis of complete preemption of federal law.' 27 In opposi-
tion to the plaintiffs motion for remand, Art Crating argued
that "removal based on federal question jurisdiction was proper
118 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393
(1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) ("Federal pre-emp-
tion is ordinarily a federal defense to the plaintiffs suit [and as such] does not
appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, does not author-
ize removal to federal court.")).
119 Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Art Crating, Inc., No. 12-CV-
5078 (N66) (VMS), 2014 WL 123488, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2014).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. (citations omitted).
123 See id. at *11.
124 Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
125 Id. (citations omitted).
126 See id. at *3-4.
127 Id. at *4.
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because [the p]laintiffs state common law claims implicated
damage to cargo during international air travel and are there-
fore completely preempted by the ... Montreal Convention."1 2 8
The court rejected this argument.12 ' The court first explained
that "[t]he Montreal Convention's preemptive scope does not
encompass every injury arising during international transporta-
tion, and it is limited to the terms of the treaty.""o Moreover,
the court concluded that "[i]t [could not] be determined from
the pleadings that, as a matter of law, the injury-causing event
occurred while the Sculpture was 'in the charge of' Delta, and
not while it was being packed or unpacked or while it was being
transported to or from the airport."1 3 1 This is because the
"[p]laintiff allege [d] only that the Sculpture was damaged dur-
ing transport, while in its crate, at some point between Novem-
ber 2010 and January 2011 [,]" which encompasses periods
before and after the Sculpture was in Delta's control.13 2 As such,
the court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of New
York. 1
IV. STANDING
A. Do NON-PASSENGERs HAVE STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE
MONTREAL CONVENTION? (WHAT IF THEIR NAMES ARE
THANKGOD AND LOVETH?)
In Ekufu v. Iberia Airlines, Gladys Agbasi flew from Lagos, Nige-
ria to O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, Illinois.1 3 4 One
of her checked bags arrived a week later and was missing some
of its contents.' 5 "The parties dispute the full list of missing
items, though both agree that certain nutritional supplements
and dried herbs and spices were among the missing contents.
[Gladys] contends that pieces of traditional Nigerian clothing
and jewelry were also missing when her bag was returned."13 6
128 Id. at *11.
129 Id.
130 Id. at *10.
131 Id. at *11.
132 Id.
13 Id. at *22.
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Gladys, her daughter Loveth, and her son-in-law Thankgod,
brought suit pro se against the airline.1 3 7 Loveth and Thankgod
were not passengers on the flight but argued that because "the
allegedly stolen items were purchased with their money, they
have standing to raise the claims."13 The court held that Loveth
and Thankgod did not have standing to sue, explaining that
Gladys "was a party to the agreement between herself and Iberia
Airlines that she entered into when she purchased her ticket,
and she personally suffered when her bag was searched and its
contents were removed."3 ' However, Loveth and Thankgod
"were not passengers, nor parties to the agreement, nor directly
harmed by Iberia."140 As such, "[t] hey cannot demonstrate that
they have a legally protected interest in [Gladys's] luggage arriv-
ing with all of its contents intact, which violates one of the Con-
stitutional requirements for standing."1"' Moreover, the non-
passengers could not "clear the prudential boundaries for stand-
ing, because [they] are not asserting their own legal rights and
interests, but rather those of [Gladys]."142
V. INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE
A. WHEN CONSIDERING WHETHER A FLIGHT IS AN
"INTERNATIONAL" FLIGHT, IS THE PASSENGER'S
INTENT IMPORTANT?
In Richards v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., the plaintiff alleged that
he purchased two first-class tickets for a flight from Bangkok to
Los Angeles via Singapore because the airline "promised an in-
ternet connection, and [the p]laintiff intended to work during
the flight. The internet connection, however, was inoperable
throughout the . . . flight, due to a faulty component."143 The
plaintiff alleged that "he would not have purchased the tickets
had he known the internet would not be available. Therefore,
137 Id. at *1-2.
138 Id. at *2.
139 Id. at *3.
140 Id.
141 Id. (citing Edgewood Manor Apartment Homes, LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co.,
733 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 2013)) (noting that a party must allege "an invasion
of a legally protected interest").
142 Id.
143 Richards v. Sing. Airlines Ltd., No. CV 13-06771 BRO (JCGx), 2013 WL
6405868, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013) (citations omitted).
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he [sought] to recover the full $16,442.20 cost of the two tickets
plus $6,500 in lost billings."'4
In answers to interrogatories, the plaintiff described the route
of his flight as follows: "Los Angeles to San Francisco to Hong
Kong to Macau, to Bangkok, Thailand, to Singapore, back to
Los Angeles."14 5 Thereafter, the defendant removed the case to
federal court, arguing the Montreal Convention completely pre-
empted the plaintiffs state law claims. 4  The plaintiff subse-
quently moved to remand.1 4 1
The court examined Article 1(1) of the Montreal Convention,
which provides the treaty "encompasses 'all international car-
riage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for re-
ward.'""4 8 Under the Convention, "international carriage" is
defined as:
any carriage in which, according to the agreement between the
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the carriage . . . are situated
either [1] within the territories of two States Parties or [2] within
the territory of a single State Party if there is an agreed stopping
place within the territory of another State, even if that State is
not a State Party.' 49
The court noted that "[the p]laintiff asserts that the only basis
for his complaint-and by extension, [the d]efendant's re-
moval-is his one-way flight from Bangkok to Los Angeles via
Singapore."o5 0 The court disagreed, explaining:
[The plaintiffs answer to the interrogatory] makes clear that the
place of departure and place of destination were within the terri-
tory of a single state party-the United States-and his flight
stopped within the territory of another state-Hong Kong, Ma-
can, Bangkok, and Singapore. Plaintiffs flight, therefore, ap-
pears, at this point, to be "international carriage" as defined by
article 1(2) of the Montreal Convention.' 51
Yet the court's analysis did not stop there.' 5 2 The plaintiff re-
lied on Ninth Circuit precedent to argue that answers to inter-
14 Id.
14 Id. (quotation marks omitted).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at *3 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art 1(1)).
149 Id. (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2)).
150 Id.
151 Id. at *4.
152 Id. at *4-5.
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rogatories cannot be considered in the removal decision.1 5 3 The
plaintiff cited Coyle v. P. T. Garuda Indonesia, which holds:
Absent an objective showing of actual knowledge by the air car-
rier of the passengers' overall itinerary-that is, an admission
that the airline . . . actually understood the disputed flight to
have been part of the decedent's international journey-. . .
other kinds of extrinsic evidence are not appropriately intro-
duced to contradict what the tickets (and the objective facts of
the ticketing) unambiguously reveal."'
The court explained:
In Coyle, the Ninth Circuit made clear that when determining
whether a flight is "international carriage" under the Treaty, the
intent of the parties is dispositive. The court explained, moreo-
ver, that the parties' intent is established "by reference to [its]
expression in the contract of transportation, i.e., the ticket or
other instrument." Extrinsic evidence may be "call jed] upon ...
to make sense of the objective indicia presented by those tickets"
and "to a limited degree. . . [to] connect flights together as, or rule
out the possibility that certain flights were, part of an undivided
transportation even when the flight coupons do not themselves
evince such a connection (or its absence)."'a
Applying these principles, the Richards court looked to the
"Passenger Name Record" for the plaintiff, which "show[ed]
only transportation 'from Bangkok to Los Angeles with an inter-
mediate stopping point in Singapore."'"" The "Passenger Name
Record" had been supplied to the court by the airline, attested
to by an airline employee."' The court concluded that the evi-
dence did not support a finding that the defendant was aware of
the plaintiffs full itinerary.1 5 8 Because "the place of departure,
Thailand, is not a signatory to the Montreal Convention, the
[c]ourt [found that the p]laintiff's flight is not subject to the
Treaty's provisions.""1 5
153 Id. at *4.
154 Id. (quoting Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indon., 363 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir.
2004)).
155 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Coyle, 363 F.3d at 987).







A. ARE EMOTIONAL INJURIES, INCLUDING A DIAGNOSIS OF
PTSD, RECOVERABLE UNDER THE
MONTREAL CONVENTION?
The Kruger case discussed earlier involved an altercation be-
tween a passenger and a flight attendant and the passenger's
later arrest while boarding a connecting flight."'o The plaintiff
claimed that she was seriously psychologically affected by the ar-
rest and that "she felt 'shock, express[ed] fear, and [became]
traumatized." 1 Moreover, "[s]he was humiliated and forever
mentally scarred."162 As a result, she claimed "[s] he has incurred
expenses for psychiatric treatment and 'continues to have night-
mares and fear, anxiety panic attacks, and has been adversely
and materially affected mentally' by [the d]efendant's acts."'
The court held that "[t] hese types of injuries, standing alone,
are not recoverable under the Convention." 6 4 This is because
courts "have consistently read the Convention to preclude recov-
ery for purely psychic injuries."' 6 ' Rather, "[r]ecovery for mental
injuries is limited to situations in which the mental injuries re-
sulted from a physical injury to the plaintiff."' 6 6
The plaintiff "also assert[ed] that she suffers from
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and that PTSD can
cause physical changes to the brain's structure."'6 ' The court ex-
plained that "[b]odily injury can include 'a change in the struc-
ture of an organ."1*68 The court was "willing to entertain the
possibility that this might be so in some cases;" however, it found
that in this particular case there was a "paucity of evidence of
physical injury. "169 As such, it concluded "that Mrs. Kruger's in-
juries were purely mental and therefor[e], not recoverable
under the Montreal Convention. "170
160 Kruger v. Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd., 976 F. Supp. 2d 290, 295 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
161 Id. at 303.
162 Id. at 303-04.
163 Id. at 304.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 303.
166 Id. (citing Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2004)).
167 Id. at 304.
168 Id. at 303 (quoting E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 541 (1991)).
169 Id. at 304.
170 Id.
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B. DO THE CONVENTION'S LIMITATIONS APPLY TO ALLEGE
INTENTIONAL CONDUCT AND WHAT SUBSTANTIVE LAW
APPLIES TO THAT DETERMINATION?
1. Article 22 (Damage Limitation)
In Ekufu, discussed earlier, "[the d]efendants also argue[d]
that Article 22 of the Montreal Convention governs the limits of
[Gladys] Agbasi's damages" related to items allegedly missing
from her luggage."' Article 22 limits damages as follows:
[I]n the carriage of baggage, the liability of the carrier in the
case of destruction, loss, damage or delay is limited to 1,000 Spe-
cial Drawing Rights for each passenger unless the passenger has
made, at the time when the checked baggage was handed over to
the carrier, a special declaration of interest in delivery at destina-
tion and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In
that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the
declared sum, unless it proves that the sum is greater than the
passenger's actual interest in delivery at destination.'
The defendants argued that the airline's liability was limited to
the amount of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR)."7 The plain-
tiff, on the other hand, "argue [d] that because the items in her
bag were 'intentionally stolen,' th[e] [c]ourt ha[d] the power to
grant 'any suitable judgment.'"174 In support of her argument,
the plaintiff pointed to Article 22(5) of the Montreal Conven-
tion, which states:
[The limitations on liability] shall not apply if it is proved that
damage resulted from any act or omission of the carrier, its ser-
vants or agents, done with the intent to cause damage or reck-
lessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result;
provided that, in the case of such an act or omission of a servant
or agent, it is also proved that such servant or agent was acting
within the scope of its employment.17 5
The court focused its attention on whether the employees
who allegedly committed the intentional acts were within the
scope of their employment."1 7  To that end, the court
"researched the issue on its own" and found no instructive opin-
17, Ekufu v. Iberia Airlines, No. 12-CV-6669, 2014 WL 87502, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 9, 2014).
172 Id. (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(2)).
173 Id.
174 Id.




ions from the Seventh Circuit."' Instead, it relied on a decision
from the Second Circuit that held the liability limitation in Arti-
cle 22(5) applied and "remanded the case so the district court
could decide [what substantive law should be] applied in deter-
mining the issue of whether an employee's alleged theft quali-
fies as intentional misconduct that could be imputed to the air
carrier under the Montreal Convention."1 7 8
Because "neither party ha[d] asserted which substantive law
should apply to this question," the court applied Illinois law.'
"Under Illinois law, courts look to the Restatement (Second) of
Agency . . . to determine whether an employee's action took
place outside the scope of his employment."18 0 The court
concluded:
[The p]laintiff failed to come forth with sufficient proof that the
Iberia employees who allegedly stole the items from her baggage
were acting within the scope of their employment. No reasonable
juror could conclude that security forces at the Nigerian airport
are employed to steal items from passengers as part of their ser-
vice to Iberia. Nor could a reasonable juror find that theft of pas-
sengers' personal items serves the goals of Iberia, who
presumably strives to offer customer service that makes passen-
gers want to become repeat customers. Having failed to produce
evidence that theft of her personal items falls within the scope of
Iberia's agents' employment, the limitations on liability provided
in Article 22(2) will apply."18 '
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts across the country continue to assess, interpret and ap-
ply-or not apply-the Montreal Convention to claims that
arise out of international carriage of passengers and property.
The case law from this past year provides further analysis on sev-
eral provisions in the treaty, as well as its preemptive effect. Yet
disagreements and divisions remain in the interpretation of
many of its provisions.
177 Id.
178 Id. (citing Shah v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 387 F. App'x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2010).
179 Id. at *5.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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